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Hello and welcome back to Communication Breakdown, a new podcast from the Observatory

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on Corporate Reputation.

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Thanks for joining us.

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I'm Steve Dowling in Silicon Valley.

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And I'm Craig Carroll in New York City.

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Each week Steve and I take a look at strategies companies are using the shape headlines and

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sometimes save their skins.

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It's a post game show for PR Pros.

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And this week, mysterious objects hovering over the skies of New Jersey.

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And they ain't reindeer.

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No, they're drones, lots of them apparently.

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Over the past few weeks, skygazing citizens from Massachusetts to Virginia have reported

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over 5,000 sightings of dancing lights of unknown origin.

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Many are presumed to be drones authorities now say, although with so many people nervously

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looking skyward, many sightings were probably planes or helicopters.

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At first, the drone spotting public had reasonable questions about whether these drone overflights

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were somehow related or if they might pose a safety threat.

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Some officials publicly worried it could be a run or China directing the drones.

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A lack of answers from local authorities, from states, even the federal government left

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a lot of room for speculation and finger pointing and just a dash of panic.

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And that's when things started to get weird.

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The governor of Maryland tweeted a picture of what he described as dozens of large drones

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over his house and he slammed the federal government for its negligent response to the crisis.

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But that constellation of lights he saw turned out to be an actual constellation, Orion, to

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be precise, the one with the three stars that make a little belt.

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And when local ABC affiliate broadcast images have an object shining brightly overhead,

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it was later determined to be the planet Venus.

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And then President-elect Trump weighed in on the drones.

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"The government knows what is happening.

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Look, our military knows where they took off from.

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If it's a garage, they can go right into that garage.

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They know where it came from and where it went.

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And for some reason, they don't want to comment.

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And I think there'd be better off saying what it is, our military knows and our president

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knows.

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And for some reason, they want to keep people in suspense.

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Something strange is going on.

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And some reason they don't want to tell the people and they should."

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Craig, last we forget, it's been about 90 years since Orson Wells told his radio audience

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that Martians had landed in Grover's Mill, New Jersey.

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And apparently a lot of folks believed him.

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Now we have a government explanation that a lot of people don't seem to want to believe

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and federal agencies are stuck trying to prove a negative.

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They're pretty sure there's no foreign power behind these sightings.

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There are no serious claims of a cover-up.

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But there are a million drones registered in the United States with some 8,000 flights

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a day, according to Homeland Security.

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And last year, the FAA changed its rules to allow more nighttime drone activity.

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But these answers all came a day late in a dollar short local officials say, and people

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seem to want some kind of action.

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Though it's not clear exactly what.

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Couldn't this whole mess have been avoided?

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Well, could have been avoided?

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Well, I would say probably not entirely, but it probably could have been managed better.

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In a situation like this, what you don't say is just as important as what you do say.

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And here, this is that the federal government didn't give very clear timely answers

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and that's left a speculation to feel.

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So I'm going to say there's three things they could have done.

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Timing, transparency, and tone.

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So first of all, just for timing, they waited till I got to acknowledge the public's concern

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and then let speculation to spiral out of control.

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So early acknowledgement, I think, basic facts probably could have helped fill the vacuum.

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I think that was actually part of the problem because they did acknowledge here and there,

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but what they failed to do, I believe, is bring everything together and provide a timely

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and comprehensive answer.

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It was like they were constantly playing whack-a-mole and were unable to get ahead of it.

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So I agree with you on timing.

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It's easier said than done a lot of times, right?

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But to get ahead of it, but I feel like you're right.

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You needed to wrap their arms around it and provide one central source of information

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than they could be answering all the questions right there.

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Timing is a part of transparency, but I think it's a larger issue.

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They needed to clearly state what they knew, what they didn't know, and what they're going

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to do to find out more.

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And bigger statements like, oh, we're investigating this, can sound a little dismissive or even

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evasive, which I think is only going to add to speculation here on the part of the

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public.

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Yeah.

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This skill here is in recognizing when just acknowledging the problem or in this case,

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the phenomenon is enough.

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This whole, we're working on it line.

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And we heard over and over again from government officials, federal government officials, that

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they were investigating, that they were applying resources to it versus when that's just not

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enough to satisfy the audience, customers, constituents.

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And I think there's probably a function of how long things went on and sort of got

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out of control.

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We should talk about how that happened.

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But people clearly wanted resolution or policy change or something.

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We want action.

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And that's what we see in these calls to just shoot them down or whatever, which I think

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is pretty widely regarded as just a bad idea.

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Yeah.

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I think, what about the last part, you know, tone?

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I think we spent too much time in media talking about the tone of articles without really

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getting into the substance here.

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But here, there's something that tone feels like, okay, it's real important, you know, the

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messaging felt a little too bureaucratic and a little reactive when it needed to be empathetic

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and confident and literally should be addressing people's anxieties directly and showing that

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they understand what the stakes are and that they were, well, saying control the situation.

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Nobody's ruling control the situation here, but at least being calm and study, you know,

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during this point.

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So these are the same principles from crisis, right, that we talk about here.

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Absolutely.

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And, you know, projecting confidence and projecting command, if you will, of the situation is one,

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even if they don't have control.

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And I think that's something that people were not getting.

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And you heard it from constituents.

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You heard it from local officials.

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You heard it from members of Congress talking about the federal government that they just

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felt like the answers were not complete.

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And they weren't seeing the response that they wanted.

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But broadened the conversation about tone for a second because if we look at tone in the

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response, I think we should talk about the tone sort of of the concerns in the minute

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because there are some interesting confluence, I think, of what factors that made this such

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a big story.

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But let's take a look at the tone of some of these answers that government officials, and

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there's a contrast here.

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And this is all, I think, way too late in the process.

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But listen to Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas.

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He was on ABC News the weekend of December 15th.

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And he was asked a bunch of very direct questions.

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And these are not indirect answers, but the direct question was, do, are you saying that

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Americans have nothing to worry about?

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Look, it is our job to be vigilant in the federal government with our state and local partners

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on behalf of the American public, and we can assure their safety by reason of that vigilance.

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We've deployed personnel, technology, and if there is any reason for concern, if we identify

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any foreign involvement or criminal activity, we will communicate with the American public

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accordingly.

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Right now, we are not aware of any.

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If we become aware of any, we will communicate accordingly and take appropriate action.

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So, it might take away there was that is not an answer that instills a lot of confidence.

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Way too many ifs.

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And it's, there's no doubt that they're taking it seriously.

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I just don't come away from an answer like that saying these guys are totally on top of

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it.

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The definitive answers that you want are not there.

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Contrast that, and these are not answers to the same question, but just in approach and

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Craig to your point, tone.

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There's transportation, secretary, Pete Buttigieg on the radio with the Breakfast Club radio

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show with Charles LeMaine, the God, and he's asked, is this an alien invasion?

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Isn't an alien invasion?

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I mean, no disrespect to New Jersey when I say that I think is very unlikely that an alien

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invasion would begin.

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Watch them out.

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We lived in, I know, but he put down.

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You know, look, I got to ask you about that, right?

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So we know that the government underestimated the issue tapping into cultural anxieties,

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right?

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Fear the unknown, mistrust of authority.

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And certainly, right, fascination with UFOs or concern over foreign threats.

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What would you do here to address these cultural touch points in a way that kind of reassures

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people that you're hearing their concerns without, certainly not, I guess, without dismissing

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them.

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Pete was a little bit dismissive there, but people were feeling this drone panic, even when

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the evidence was not, you know, very, very strong in the, certainly not that there was some

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alien invasion.

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I look at it as a confluence of factors.

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And we talk about tone like you have this mistrust in government and a general anger among

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the electorate as others have pointed out as a factor in this.

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People are just not happy with their leadership right now.

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And that, that taints, I think, a lot of the earnest answers that you might have heard from

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government officials.

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Then you have this hyper-excelerant of social media where you can end up with these conspiracy

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theories about some Iranian mothership off the coast that's launching drones and being

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able to knock down those rumors definitively.

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I mean, that's one where the Pentagon actually did have to come out and say, nope, there isn't,

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but to let it get to that point, that's the mistake.

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That's why I say the skill here is recognizing when you can just say we're on top of it versus

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when there's enough concern that you have to show some action.

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And the maddening part of this whole episode is that it does, when you look at it, feel like

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it was just happening like a slow-motion train wreck.

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You keep watching this conversation going.

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And the federal government is not saying enough or not addressing things directly.

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And you end up where you have this borderline hysteria.

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And the last factor I would suggest is this timing.

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We're still in this sort of post-election news vacuum, even though there have been big

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stories in the past month.

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This one has this large footprint and this element of mystery or conspiracy.

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And I think, again, in the wake of the election with the holidays upon us, I think people

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probably just got caught off guard and they weren't addressing it as directly definitively

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as they could have in the beginning.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Certainly, the media here, both traditional and social media were amplifying the drama with

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local stories, snowballing and the national panic.

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Kind of reminds me of some of the early mass-com research going back to the 30s and 40s

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a little bit here.

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One of the issues here is how we think about the media landscape here and just how

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fragmented it is right now and how different narratives can accelerate.

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We just have to be ready to interject facts earlier under the storyline here.

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And part of it is that with this being fueled by social peer-to-peer sharing and social

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media amplification, it just makes the speculation spread far more than facts.

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I know we need to be monitoring social media channels and be ready to respond in real time

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and deploy rapid response messaging to counter misinformation.

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But there's so much here we still don't know.

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And I say this as I'm packing drones and to my suitcase that I bought for family members

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for it.

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I just gave away by Christmas presents too early.

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But yeah, I would tell you this made me a little nervous here, right?

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I'm thinking, should I be traveling with this given how little we know about, you know,

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I mean, there's so little legislation about drones.

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And you know, drone regulation, countermeasures are still evolving and the government is not

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doing a very good job of helping us here.

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But you know, communicating with what is being done within the existing legal frameworks

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and emphasizing progress on new legislation to address public safety concerns.

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I know personally, I'm scared of Google.

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Am I okay to travel with these things?

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Yeah, I think one of the major factors here is fragmentation.

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It's a hard year point.

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Everybody's monitoring social media and it's, but it's not because the, there's a fragmentation

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of where people are getting their information and also where they are expressing their concerns.

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This is how we're seeing stories snowball because they're not getting, they're not getting

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shut down.

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And the fragmented nature of the, of social media now.

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And even, you know, more mainstream media, it's allowing if not encouraging this kind of

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rampant speculation.

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Generally speaking, from the public perspective, you know, how to drone operate, who uses them?

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What can you expect?

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Where do you buy them?

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Should they be available publicly?

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Little things like that for most people are part of the puzzle here that I've not really,

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those pieces have not really been put in place.

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It's interesting because we heard a number of times from the federal government and those

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supporting those efforts that the federal government wants, you know, to give states more

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authority over these drones.

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The federal government wants to, wants to increase controls in that way.

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And but I didn't hear a lot of specifics.

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So when you hear about resources, when you hear about, you know, we're on top of it, or

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specifics in that way, even a proposal that people might find objectionable, might have

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concentrated the response and snapped people out of this mania.

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Yeah.

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I heard that actually was a very good proposal to ground all drones for 48 hours or 72 hours.

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Right?

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Yeah.

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Well, you might say, maybe in, excuse me, commercial drones would be the exception, but that's an

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action that people would have had one of two reactions to, I think, a few, yes, great

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ground, ground them all so that we can understand what's actually up there because if we know it's

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not a drone or two, oh, whoa, wait a second.

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Don't ground the drones.

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And now you get forced people to say, oh, well, maybe drones up there isn't the worst thing

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in the world.

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And maybe I'm not as concerned about it as I might have otherwise been when there was

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a lot of uncertainty.

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So I feel like this is one of those crisis situations where number one, you need to look at it

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and have somebody hopefully in the organization puts their hand up and says, hey, folks, this

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could get out of control really quick, right?

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And one of the factors, by the way, that I would have applied to this is that this happened

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in the Northeast corridor.

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And I think more than anywhere else in America, a local story there has a potential fast

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track to national news just because of population density, you know, it's where the media is concentrated.

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And you know, something like this, if the same thing had happened in San Francisco or Los

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Angeles, I don't know that it would have, you know, blown up into the national and political

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issue that it has.

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But I think that that is the skill for communications organizations is to identify something even

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though it's not the number one thing on social media yet or an issue that you're hearing

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in huge amounts like having a nose for news and looking at this and saying, yeah, this is

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one we'd better be ready to address or we'd better get out in front of and start addressing.

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What do you think about what companies should be thinking about in terms of like if something

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like this were to affect them, right?

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I mean, drones flying over their parking lots or flying over company facilities or is

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there any unique response or anything to the situation we might think about from a company

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perspective?

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Well, I mean, you know, corporate espionage is real and whether drones are a part of that,

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I mean, it's just this is the problem is it's very easy to consider a drone innocuous

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because most of them are, but this is one for corporate security and understanding where

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they were drones launch from, I think is a is a really important one.

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Sure.

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Are these coming from far away?

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Is this a hobbyist or an enthusiast who is just, you know, in the parking lot next door?

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I think that just like folks are being told on the East Coast right now, taking matters

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into your own hands on drones is not a good idea.

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I've seen some pretty wild contraptions in the past of like, you know, launching some sort

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of like net that will capture a drone or whatever.

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I would not I would not encourage anybody to go shooting down drones or trying to interrupt

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drone traffic.

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It could be just the the is just too dangerous of a prospect.

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Bad idea.

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Well, okay.

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Yes.

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So I think there's also some things here that we think we can think about though from a company

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perspective.

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One is a drone certain new thing and we certainly need to understand more about them.

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I don't know enough about them yet.

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I'm giving them way for holiday gifts, but for companies here, I think, you know, we got

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to understand, okay, what is this going to mean?

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Like, you know, what what type of drone activities going on in your operational areas?

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Are you going to need to implement or upgrade drone detection systems to monitor the airspace

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over your headquarters or your your critical infrastructures?

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You know, we also have to think about security protocols.

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I know right now a lot of companies are thinking about cybersecurity, but this is this is another

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matter, right?

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This is about your airspace.

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And so, you know, just making sure you security measures are up to up to date to deal

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with drone related threats or, you know, unauthorized surveillance or data collection, tie to your

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facilities.

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Companies, you know, they also need to be, you know, hand in tow with government officials.

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I know right now there's a lot of jockeying back and forth among politicians.

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But, you know, companies are still going to have to work with federal and local law enforcement

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agencies to if they're going to make sure that timely updates are received and see guidance

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on how to manage drone related incidents.

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You see, old rule of thumb that's popularized in New York.

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If you see something, say something like bringing bringing these to the two authorities, if

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you're worried about someone spying on your building, your parking lot, it's the data collection,

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I think that drones enable that is the risky part for companies.

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Yeah.

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I wouldn't be surprised if a few companies update their response plans or crisis plans to,

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you know, include procedures for reporting signings or mitigating potential threats.

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I don't know.

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It's just literally adding another dimension to the security concerns that companies already

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have to deal with.

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Yeah.

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Probably still end on the same note we began, right?

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The main thing is you have to anticipate the vacuum if you're not being proactive with

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getting your message out there.

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Others are going to feel the silence.

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And when they do, it's really going to be the narrative that you want.

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So you've got to be aware of how the spread of rumors can quickly speculate, take your

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life on its own.

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And so you need to make sure that you offer what perspective you can earn the process.

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You should not agree more.

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And that is our show for this week.

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We want to thank Shawn P Neal and the PeopleForward Network for making our podcast possible.

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If you'd like to tell us what you think or if you have a topic you'd like to suggest

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for our show, we would love to hear from you.

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Our email address is podcast@ocrnetwork.com.

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Communication breakdown is a production of the Observatory on Corporate Reputation.

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Have a happy holiday, Craig and our producer, Shawn, and wish you safe travels.

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I'm Steve Dowling.

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And I'm Craig Carroll.

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Thanks for listening.

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Our next episode will be pre-recorded for the holidays.

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Then we'll be back in January with a new topic, old discussion.

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See you in the new year.

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[MUSIC]

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